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UNDERMINING JUSTICE:
THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S ROLE IN RESTRICTING ACCESS TO
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
ROBERT R. KUEHN*

I. INTRODUCTION

It has often been said that a right without a remedy is no right at all. Even with a
remedy, in most situations, enforcing or defending a legal right requires the
assistance of an attorney. Complex legal rules, stringent procedural requirements,
and an adversarial system that functions best when both sides are represented by
competent attorneys leave the unrepresented at a substantial, and in most situations
insurmountable, disadvantage. As the Supreme Court observed, "Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law"! Thus,
one reason for the popular observation that only a fool would have himself as a
client.
The absence of an attorney can be especially hard on the poor. Many lower
income people rely on government programs to obtain essential human needs,2
making their reliance on the law and its enforcement greater than for more affluent
citizens. 3 One commentator argued, "[i]t seems self-evident that the poor ... and
other disadvantaged are ... more likely to suffer distress and injustice than those
better off.',4 As a consequence, the poor are more likely to need the assistance of the
judicial system to address those wrongs. In addition, lower-income persons likely
encounter greater geographical, literacy, cultural, and language barriers just to access
the justice system, much less to use the system successfully. All of these factors

* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The author thanks Jennifer
Shea for her research assistance.
1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
2 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CWIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2005) [hereinafter LSC
REPORT].
3 Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 737, 750 (2002). As a legal needs study found, "[1]egal problems
experienced by low-income people are substantially more likely [than moderate-income
people] to relate to family safety (including domestic violence), economic security, housing
and other basic needs." TASK FORCE ON CNIL EQUAL JUSTICE FuNDING, WASH. STAlE
SUPREME COURT, THE WASHINGTON STAlE CWIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 37 (2003), available
at http://www.courts.wa.govInewsinfo/contentltaskforce/Ci vilLegalNeeds.pdf [hereinafter
WASH. STUDY].
4 JOEL F. HANDIER, THE CONDmONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BUREAUCRACY 24 (1986).

1039

1040

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No.4

come together to produce a perverse result-those most in need of legal assistance
must overcome the greatest obstacles to obtain that assistance.
Congress recognized the important role legal assistance plays in protecting the
poor when it declared the need "to provide equal access to the system of justice in
our Nation for individuals who seek redress of grievances" and created the Legal
Services Corporation ("LSC") to provide "high quality legal assistance to those who
would otherwise be unable to afford adequate legal counsel."s More recently, the
president of the American Bar Association ("ABA") called on the legal profession to
"make good, finally, on the promise of equal justice-and equal access to justice
for all Americans ... [and] consider providing such a right [to counsell-as many
nations of the world already have-for serious civil matters that threaten the
integrity of one's family, shelter or health.,,6 In sum, the American ideal of equal
justice under law, described by a former Supreme Court Justice as "perhaps the most
inspiring ideal of our society,,,7 requires equal access to legal representation.
Yet, study after study has documented the wide gap between legal needs and
the availability of an attorney, especially for the poor. A 1994 ABA study found that
lower-income households averaged approximately one civil legal need each year, yet
only about one in four were able to address the need through the civil justice
system. 8 A number of recent state legal needs studies similarly found that fewer than
twenty percent of the legal problems experienced by low-income people are

Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000).
Michael S. Greco, Address to the American Bar Association House of Delegates, 16
PROF. LAW. 1, 4 (2005); see also TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, ABA, REPORT TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGAlES No. 112A, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/sclaidldownloads/06AI12A.pdf (urging federal and state governments ''to
provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in . . .
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake").
7 Francis J. Larkin, The Legal Services Corporation Must Be Saved, JUDGES' J., Winter
1995, at 1, 1 ("Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of the Supreme
Court building. It is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society . . . . It is fundamental that
justice should be the same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic status."
(quoting Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.)). Judge Learned Hand once said: "If we are to keep
democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice." Karen A. Lash et
aI., Equal Access to Civil Justice: Pursuing Solutions Beyond the Legal Profession, 17 YALE
L. & POL'y REv. 489, 501 & n.39 (1998) (quoting from Judge Hand's February 16, 1951
address to the Legal Aid Society of New York); see also Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in
Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PuBUC GoOD 1, 6 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995)
("[A]ccess to minimal legal services is necessary for access to the legal system, and without
access to the legal system, there is no equality before the law. The lawyer becomes the critical
medium by which access to that legal system and the concomitant opportunity to secure justice
is achieved.").
8 CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PuB., ABA, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE,
A SURVEY OF AMERICANS: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSNE LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY 11,23 (1994).
5
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addressed with the assistance of an attorney.9 According to one study, nine out of ten
low-income households that get no attorney assistance end up receiving no help at
all; among the ten percent that try to get other help, most tum to community
organizations that cannot provide legal assistance.10
One reason poor people experience a large percentage of unmet legal needs is
that so few attorneys are available for the poor. Although one in seven Americans
lives in poverty, only one percent of attorneys are dedicated to serving the legal
needs of the poor. 11 "[T]here is about one lawyer for every 240 non-poor Americans,
but only one lawyer for every 9,000 Americans whose low income would qualify for
civil legal aid.,,12 As former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed:
While lawyers have much we can be proud of, we also have a great
deal to be ashamed of in terms of how we are responding to the needs of
people who can't afford to pay our services .... [T]here has probably
never been a wider gulf between the need for legal services and the
availability of legal services. 13
Individual attorneys and local, state, and national bar assocIatIons have
recognized this serious problem and have made significant efforts to provide free
legal assistance to those unable to afford the services of an attorney. A recent ABA
pro bono survey found that sixty percent "of respondents provided free legal services
to persons of limited means" and one-third provided free services to organizations
that "serve the poor.,,14 Of those attorneys doing pro bono work, the average attorney
provided twenty-seven hours per year to people of limited means and twelve hours
per year to organizations serving the poor. 15 Yet overall, "[a]ccording to the best
estimates available, the profession as a whole provides less than half an hour per

9 LSC REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting the results of studies from 2000 through
2005 in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Washington); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting
Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 371 (2004) ("According to most
estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of low income individuals ... remain
unmet.").
10 WASH. STUDY, supra note 3, at 49.
11 Rhode, supra note 9, at 371.
12 David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest
wwyers, 91 CAL. L. REv. 209, 211 (2003).
13 Katzmann, supra note 7, at 2 (containing excerpt from Justice O'Connor's Pro Bono
Work-Good News and Bad News speech at the ABA's 1991 Annual Meeting in Atlanta,
Georgia).
14 STANDING COMM. ON PRo BONO & PuB. SERV., ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A
REPORT ON THE PRo BONO WORK OF AMERICA'S LAWYERS 11 (2005), available at http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report.pdf [hereinafter SUPPORTING JUSTICE].
15 Id. at 12-13.
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week of assistance to the poor.,,16 In addition, Professor Deborah Rhode argues that
of the pro bono work that is done, most is donated to friends, relatives, or matters
designed to help attract paying clients. I? Unpopular clients and causes are usually
avoided, in particular by law firms not wanting to offend paying clients. 18 Moreover,
lengthy, complex cases that may provide significant benefits to large groups of the
poor are unlikely to be handled by a private lawyer working pro bono. 19
Despite the acknowledged importance of legal representation and widespread
unmet legal needs of the poor, Congress has imposed significant restrictions on the
types of indigent clients and cases that LSC attorneys may represent, as well as
restrictions on how eligible cases may be handled. 20 These restrictions on access to
legal representation have been criticized by the ABA and some state bar associations
as contrary to the ideals of equal justice and principles of the legal profession. 21
Notwithstanding this criticism, attorneys and bar associations have similarly
restricted the assistance available to the poor through a number of civil legal
assistance programs. In some situations, attorneys and bar associations have
purposefully chosen to deny free legal assistance to certain unpopular clients or

Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283, 291
(1998); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit ofthe Public Good: Access to Justice in the
United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 1, 11 (2001) ("Most troubling. after growth in pro
bono activity during the 1980s, the trend in the last years of the twentieth century was
backward: The average attorney at the wealthiest 100 firms in the United States dedicated one
third less time to pro bono work in 1999 than in 1992."); Lua Kamal Yuille, Note, No One's
Perfect (Not Even Close): Reevaluating Access to Justice in the United States and Western
Europe, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 902--03 (2004) ("[N]ationally, various estimates
indicate that between 50% and 93% of lawyers do not perform any pro bono work at al1.").
17 Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law
Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2415, 2423 (1999); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODEL
LEGAL ErnICS § 16.9 (1986) (observing that what some lawyers call pro bono often advances
new client development, seeks to create goodwill with judges and other attorneys, or consists
of volunteer work for bar committees but does not address the legal needs of the poor);
Carolyn Elefant, Can Law Firms Do Pro Bono? A Skeptical View of Law Firms' Pro Bono
Programs, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 95, 102--03 (1991) (arguing that some law fmns use pro bono
work to develop profitable business contacts).
18 See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 61-62
(1988); Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in
Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1395, 1418, 1420 (1998).
19 See Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78, 91-92 (1990) (arguing that volunteer lawyer programs
focus on simple matters and cases not addressing mainstream poverty issues).
20 See infra Part II.
21 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 399 (1996)
[hereinafter Formal Ope 399] (discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers who receive LSC
money and how ideally there would be no restrictions at all); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., A Call for the Repeal or Invalidation of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services
Lawyers, 53 REc. ASS'NBAR CITY N.Y. 13 (1998).
16

2006]

UNDERMINING JUSTICE

1043

causes, or prohibit attorneys for the poor from using the same legal tools available to
attorneys for private clients. In other situations, attorneys and bar associations have
unwittingly imposed restrictions on the recipients of funds intended to expand access
to free legal assistance.
This Article analyzes the complicity of lawyers in restricting the availability of
legal assistance to low-income people. Part II examines the restrictions imposed by
Congress on the availability of free legal assistance for the poor and their effects on
access to justice. Part ill chronicles the role the legal profession has played in
imposing similar restrictions on lawyer-financed or -sponsored legal assistance
programs for the poor. 22 Part N considers the professional implications of the
profession's role in restricting access to legal representation and making it more
difficult for some unpopular clients and causes to obtain justice. Finally, Part V
concludes that individual attorneys, judges, and organized bar associations must
consider the extent to which their programs and policies restrict the ability of some
unpopular clients and causes to gain access to justice and must actively remove these
restrictions.

II.

CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The LSC funding is the largest single source of funding for civil legal
assistance for the poor, providing over $291 million in 2005. 23 However, through
regulations and appropriations governing the LSC, Congress has imposed severe
restrictions on access to legal representation for lower-income persons. Ideally,
Congress would have formulated restrictions based on an analysis of the most
important legal needs of the poor, but it did not. Instead, the restrictions are political
choices reflecting congressional disapproval of certain unpopular clients or causes.

A. Restrictions on Unpopular Clients
As originally passed in 1974, the Legal Services Corporation Act ("LSC Act")
did not deny assistance to any class of persons, other than to limit eligibility to those
unable to afford legal assistance. 24 Beginning in 1980, Congress adopted restrictions
on the use of LSC funds for representing certain aliens, and expanded these
22 In focusing on legal assistance programs, this Article does not address the contention
that the bar has denied access to legal assistance by fighting for restraints on the ability of
nonlawyers to provide assistance on routine legal matters. See Deborah L. Rhode, Equal
Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 47,60-61

(2003).
23 PROJECT TO ExpAND RESOURCES FOR LEGAL SERVS. (PERLS), ABA, A CHART OF
SIGNIFICANT FuNDRAISING ACTIVITIES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, 2005 UPDAlE (2006)
[hereinafter PERLS CHART]; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, ABA PERLS, to author (July
17,2006) (on file with author).
24 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000)) [hereinafter LSC Act].
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restrictions in 1983 and 1996 at the urging of farmers upset about migrant farm
workers litigating for back wages. 25 Today, a number of categories of aliens residing
in the United States, including many who are in the country legally, are ineligible for
free legal assistance from funds appropriated by Congress. 26 Thus, LSC grantees are
prohibited from representing not only undocumented or illegal aliens, but also many
legal aliens, including some workers recruited into the country under special work
visas and individuals on temporary visas, such as student visas. 27 In addition, under
the 1996 restrictions, recipients of LSC funds cannot even represent these excluded
categories of aliens with non-LSC funds, such as private or state-appropriated
funds. 28 Because of the lack of non-LSC-funded legal services, aliens in some areas
of the country are now effectively shut off from free legal assistance programs. 29
25 Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 2187, 2194 (1999). The most stringent restrictions on LSC funds were
imposed by Congress in 1996 with the enactment of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 [hereinafter LSC
Appropriations Act]. These restrictions have been renewed by Congress in each subsequent
LSC appropriation. See Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (2006); Pub. L. No. 108-447,
118 Stat. 2809 (2005); Pub. L. No. 108-199,118 Stat. 3 (2004); Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.
11 (2003); Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001); Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762
(2000); Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999); Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998); Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997).
26 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(11); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1626.1 to .12 (2005). David Pai
explained Congress's motivation for denying legal assistance to certain aliens:

Lobbyists sent wave after wave of complaints from private, individual farmers to
testify about their business losses resulting from migrant farm workers who
litigated for back wages. Ultimately, the farmers and their lobbyists convinced
members of Congress that appropriating funds to be used by noncitizens against a
sizeable voting constituency verged on political suicide.
David Pai, When Congress Gives You Lemons: Alternatives to Legal Services Corporation
Funding in the Quest to Provide Access to Justice, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LJ. 83, 88
(2004).
27 Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, /fYou Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts?
Some Implications for Judges when Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers on
Behalf ofthe Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 873,878 & n.15 (2002); Laura K. Abel & Risa E.
Kaufman, Preserving Aliens' and Migrant Workers' Access to Civil Legal Services:
Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491, 496--97 (2003).
28 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(d)( 1) ("[N]o recipient [of LSC funds] shall accept
funds from any source other than the Corporation, unless the Corporation or the recipient, as
the case may be, notifies in writing the source of the funds that the funds may not be expended
for any purpose prohibited by the Legal Services Corporation Act or this title."); 45 C.F.R. §§
1610.1 to .9 (2005).
29 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 497; David S. Udell, The Legal Services
Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17
YALEL. &PoL'yREv. 337,359 (1998).
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Denying aliens access to legal representation cannot be defended on the ground that
aliens lack legal rights. Commentators have noted that "[bloth legal and
undocumented aliens in this country are generally entitled to the same legal
protections as everyone else.,,3o Hence, rights under the Equal Protection Clause,
labor laws, employment discrimination statutes, and workers' compensation
programs generally extend to undocumented workers? 1 As the Supreme Court
explained in 1896, because an alien owes obedience to the laws of the country where
residing, that person is therefore entitled to the equal protection of those laws. 32
Nor can a restriction on access to legal representation for aliens be explained by
a lack of need for assistance. Undocumented aliens are often particularly vulnerable
to workplace exploitation because of the fear that if they seek to enforce legal rights
their employers may retaliate by assisting with their deportation. Moreover, language
barriers, lack of familiarity with the legal system, geographical isolation, and
dependency on employers for food and housing make even legal aliens vulnerable to
exploitation and being cut off from legal assistance. 33
Although the denial of legal assistance to undocumented aliens might seem
satisfactory to those concerned with illegal immigration, legal residents of the United
States may well be harmed by denying undocumented or illegal aliens access to
attorneys. Because illegal workers are largely shut out of the legal system, employers
who hire illegal aliens learn that those employees are unable to challenge unlawful
employment practices or conditions, unlike employees who are able to access legal
aid. An attorney for legal services in Florida observed that this denial of access to
legal representation has encouraged employers seeking to evade enforcement of
worker protection laws to favor illegal aliens over legal workers with access to
attorneys and the justice system. 34
Prisoners are similarly unpopular with Congress. In 1996, Congress passed a
broad prohibition on civil litigation by LSC attorneys on behalf of an incarcerated

Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 500.
Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407,415-16 (1995)
(noting that undocumented workers are protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, employment discrimination statutes, and workers'
compensation regimes).
32 Wing v. lTnited States, 163 U.S. 228, 242--43 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws
that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is
domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws . . . in
face of the great constitutional amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
33 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 494; Sudha Shetty, Equal Justice Under the Law:
Myth or Reality for Immigrants and Refugees?, 2 SEATILEJ. Soc. JUST. 565,566-67 (2004).
34 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS: WHAT Is REAlLY BEHIND
AITACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS? 11 (2001), available at http://www.brennancenter.org!
dynamic/subpages/atj7.pdf.
30
31
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person. 35 Although the LSC funding restriction was prompted by objections to
litigation over jail conditions, it broadly prohibits representation even if the potential
client has not been convicted of a crime and extends to any civil case, even unrelated
cases that may have arisen prior to the incarceration. 36 Professor Deborah Rhode
contends that this unavailability contributes to a belief among prison employees that
they will not be held accountable for sexual abuse of inmates. 37
Congress also deems persons charged with drug crimes, even where they have
not yet been convicted, unworthy of legal representation in any eviction proceeding
brought by a public housing agency because the illegal drug activity allegedly
threatens health or safety.38
The goal of Congress in enacting these restrictions was summarized by a
congressman during the debate over the 1996 restrictions: to stop "unpopular
individuals [from bringing] unpopular lawsuits" through the LSC. 39 The result is that
significant numbers of aliens, prisoners, and persons charged with drug crimes lack
access to civil legal services.4o By forcing many poor persons to appear in court
proceedings pro se, the restrictions also increase burdens on judges and courtS.41

B. Restrictions on Unpopular Causes
If Congress deems aliens, prisoners, and those charged with drug crimes
"unpopular individuals," then it deems efforts to enforce rights relating to abortion,
redistricting, desegregation, and selective service as "unpopular lawsuits" that the
poor ought not to bring with federally filnded attorneys. Thus, in adopting the LSC
Act in 1974, Congress prohibited the use of funds to provide legal assistance to low
income persons for any proceeding relating to school desegregation, abortion, or a

LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(15); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1637.1 to.5 (2005).
Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 878-79; Udell, supra note 29, at 360-61.
37 Deborah L. Rhode, Rape in Prison: Indifference Rules, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 29, 2001, at
35

36

A25.
LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(17); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1633.1 to .4 (2005).
142 CONGo REc. 13, 18630 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schiff) (characterizing
arguments against actions of LSC grantees). A Senate report on the 1996 LSC Act objected
that LSC grantees "continue to represent plaintiffs in cases that the vast majority of Americans
do not support." S. REp. No. 104-392, at 3 (1996).
40 See Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 875 n.3 (listing reports on the effects of the
federal restrictions); Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 497-98; Laurence E. Norton, IT, Not
Too Much Justicefor the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REv. 601, 608--09 (1997).
41 Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of
Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 1537, 1548 (2005)
(''The increase in pro se litigation has disrupted the efficiency of the courts, causing courtroom
delays and overburdening judges, attorneys, and court staff.").
38
39
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violation of the Military Selective Service Act. 42 Those restrictions continue today,
joined in 1996 by a new congressional restriction on advocating or opposing any
legislative, judicial, or elective redistricting plan. 43
As with the client restrictions, Congress did not base these prohibitions on an
assessment of the legal needs of the poor, the costs and benefits of such
representation, or the availability of alternate sources of legal assistance. Rather,
critics note the restrictions reflected the displeasure of certain members of Congress
with court decisions or successful lawyering by advocates for the poor. For example,
a representative critical of the role of a legal services grantee in a Detroit
desegregation case introduced the restriction on school desegregation cases. 44 The
stated purpose for denying assistance relating to a poor person's constitutional right
to an abortion was to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roe v.
Wade. 45 As one commentator noted, "the legislative history surrounding the
restrictions ... reveals a clear congressional intent to 'punish' advocates" of these
disfavored causes.46
Proponents claimed the restrictions would "de-politicize" legal services lawyers
by removing them from controversial cases. However, it is not political for a lawyer
to assist a poor person in enforcing or defending legal rights, as that is what lawyers
do every day, without objection, for paying clients. In addition, access to legal
assistance and the courts is often necessary to balance the power of the legislative
and executive branches and to ensure that constitutional and legislatively created
rights are equally available to the rich and poor. As one senator explained in
rebutting charges that providing legal assistance was improperly political: "When
migrant workers and other poor individuals assert their legal rights, they can offend

42 LSC Act § 1OO7(b)(7)-(9) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996(t)(8)-(10)
(2000)); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(a)(7)-(9) (2005); see Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 451-71a (2000).
43 See LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(b)(1) (2005).
44 Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L.
REv. 681, 697 n.115 (1976) (noting that the restriction was introduced by a representative who
had focused on the role of the Center for Law and Education in the Detroit school
desegregation case of Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972)).
45 Id. at 697 n.116 (noting that one of Representative Hogan's stated purposes in adding
the restriction on abortion was "to 'respond' to the 'shocking' Supreme Court decisions on
abortion"); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46 Clifford M. Greene et al., Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of
the Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 734, 739 n.34 (1976). A report by
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York drew a similar conclusion about the 1996
restrictions: "Congressional proponents of the LSC restrictions made clear that their aim was
to reduce or eliminate advocacy of disfavored positions." Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
supra note 21, at 52; see also BRENNAN ClR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 14-15 (arguing
that the motive behind denying federal funding to enforce certain statutory and constitutional
rights was that certain special interest groups disapproved of those rights).
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powerful interests in society. That does not mean there is something wrong with the
[LSC] program; it means that it is doing its job.,,47
In passing the LSC Act, Congress acknowledged that "providing legal
assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal counsel will serve
best the ends of justice.,,48 Yet for a poor person with access only to an LSC-funded
attorney, certain unpopular legal rights cannot be defended or enforced.

c.

Restrictions on Methods ofLegal Representation

The congressional purpose of the LSC Act declares that attorneys "must have
full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients" in keeping with rules of
professional responsibility and the high standards of the legal profession. 49 In fact, as
David Udell observed, a number of bar associations conditioned their support for the
LSC Act on the insistence that lawyers for the poor have the same independence of
professional judgment as is guaranteed to attorneys representing paying clients. 5o
Nevertheless, Congress now prohibits LSC grantees from participating in class
action lawsuits, accepting attorneys' fee awards, soliciting new clients, and lobbying
legislatures or government agencies.
Class action lawsuits can be a significant and efficient means of addressing
widespread violations of legal rights that otherwise might be ignored by the
offending party or too difficult to litigate as individual cases. Commentators have
documented numerous LSC class actions that brought important legal relief to large
groups of poor persons. 51 When Congress frrst adopted the LSC Act, it permitted

47 Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our
National Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 742 (quoting
former Sen. Warren Rudman). As Rep. Christopher Shays argued: "What I cannot understand
is why we blame [LSC-funded lawyers] for seeking to enforce laws we pass and the
Constitution of the United States we would die defending." BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 34, at 20.
48 LSC Act § 1000(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1) (2000».
49 I d. § 1000(6).
50 David S. Udell, Implication of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government
Grantsfor Lawyering for the Poor, 25 FORDHAMURB. LJ. 895, 901-02 (1998).
51 Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the
Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-14
(2005); Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor-A Commentary,
83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1686 (1995). Maryland Attorney General J. Joseph Curran explained in a
1995 letter to Congress why class actions are an important tool for the poor:

Sometimes Legal Services attorneys enforce the law by filing class-actions against
the state . . . . Although I am happy to say that I believe the state of Maryland has
had the better legal position in most of the cases, sometimes we don't. Government
is not infallible. As uncomfortable and irritating as it may be, sometimes it is class
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class action suits, provided the local project director approved the case in accordance
with policies adopted by the grantee's governing board. 52 Upset with the success of
some class actions and pressured by special interest groups to rein in LSC attorneys,
Congress acted in 1996 to bar LSC grantees from initiating or participating in any
class action lawsuit, even with non-LSC funds. 53
There are many objections to denying an attorney the ability to address legal
problems through a class action. In many situations, unlawful actions will go
unchallenged, especially where claims may be too small or cumbersome to pursue
individually, because a class action may be the only way to address such problems. 54
In addition, while class actions can force the defendant to change an entire program
rather than simply the treatment of one complainant, the defendant can easily resolve
or moot an individual lawsuit simply by settling with one plaintiff. 55 Consequently,
class actions can have a much greater deterrent effect on unlawful conduct than
individual suits. In some cases, the mere threat of being able to bring a class action
lawsuit can deter the wrongdoer.
Moreover, contrary to Congress's stated intent to ensure lawyers have full
freedom to protect the interests of their clients, the restriction on class actions denies
LSC attorneys the freedom to use a legal tool that may be in the best interests of their
clients and available to other attorneys not encumbered by the restriction. As a
practical matter, while restricted attorneys can attack the client-by-elient symptoms
of the problems that poor persons face, congressional restrictions largely deny them
the ability to attack the legal causes of such problems. 56
The unavailability of class actions is especially problematic for the poor as their
legal problems are often institutional in nature and in need of systemic changes. 57

actions by Legal Services lawyers that require the state to do what it is legally
bound to do.
BRENNAN Cm. FOR JUSTICE, MAKING THE CASE: LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 13-14
(1999) (quoting from the letter).
52 LSC Act § l006(d)(5) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (2000». In
addition, grantees could use non-LSC funds for class actions. Houseman, supra note 25, at
2200.
53 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(7); 45 C.F.R. § 1617.5 (2005).
54 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 51, at 11.
55 Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and
Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 17-18 (1984); Rhode, supra note 9, at 389.
56 The inability to potentially bring a class action lawsuit to address illegal conduct has
pushed legal services offices away from "wholesale justice" strategies to "retail justice"
services with more limited relief to plaintiffs and fewer poor people assisted. Udell, supra note
29, at 362--63.
57 Failinger & May, supra note 55, at 18. As the Supreme Court observed, for politically
and economically weak groups, "association for litigation may be the most effective form of
political association." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); see also NAACP v.
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For the poor, most class actions seek government agency or private party compliance
with the law, rather than monetary damages. 58 The ban means that many unlawful
actions will now go unchallenged and LSC-funded attorneys will be unable to bring
greater legal relief to large groups of affected persons. lllegal acts against large
classes of poor persons may be immunized from some claims, especially where the
monetary harm to each individual person is relatively small.
Congress also acted in 1996 to prohibit LSC attorneys from accepting
attorneys' fees. 59 The attorneys' fee restriction, enacted in response to complaints
from the Farm Bureau over awards to legal aid lawyers from fanners who violated
the law, applies even where the fees are statutorily permitted or required and even if
the LSC grantee did not request fees but a court wished to grant them anyway.60 The
inability to obtain attorneys' fees from the losing party means that poor persons have
lost a form of legal relief that can significantly deter illegal conduct, since a
prospective defendant might be less likely to engage in illegal conduct knowing it
would be subject to the additional penalty of having to pay the poor person's
attorneys' fees. Indeed, one reason courts award fees in civil rights cases is to help
ensure compliance with the laws, both by increasing the costs of noncompliance
with the law and by supporting lawsuits where the costs of bringing suit might
otherwise be prohibitive.
The ban on attorneys' fees may also harm a poor person's ability to induce a
settlement. When a party is faced with the possibility of paying both its own and its
opponent's attorneys' fees, any advantage from dragging out the lawsuit can become
prohibitively costly.61 In addition, the ban denies any opportunity to structure a
settlement that might involve waiving some statutory fees. Thus, an attorney for a
poor person is without the same leverage in settlement negotiations that other parties
enjoy. Finally, the ban on attorneys' fees denies legal services offices an important
potential source of funding, effectively losing millions of dollars in fee awards that
could be used to serve other needy clients. 62 Once again, a legal tool available to
wealthier clients is denied to attorneys representing the poor.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.").
58 Blank & Zacks, supra note 51, at 15.
59 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a); 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3 (2005).
60 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a); 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3 (2005); BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 6.
61 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (observing that the availability of statutory attorneys' fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases "gives defendants strong incentives to avoid arguable
civil rights violations in the fITst place and to make concessions in hope of an early
settlement"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Ope 1403 (1977)
(observing that the availability of statutory attorneys' fees is a negotiation tool for legal aid
clients); see also Udell, supra note 50, at 903.
62 See, e.g., Udell, supra note 29, at 359 (discussing how Florida Rural Voting Rights
Project received over $2 million in attorneys' fees during the first half of the 1990s and how it
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Congress also prohibits lawyers for the poor from representing a client whom
the lawyer advised to obtain counselor take legal action, even if the attorney simply
communicated the advice by a personal letter or telephone cal1. 63 Agricultural
employers pushed Congress to adopt this restriction as a way to limit the ability of
LSC grantees to reach out to migrant farm workers in need of legal assistance. 64 The
LSC has interpreted this restriction to prohibit a grantee from handing out ail
informational brochure about the availability of its free legal services to
unrepresented tenants waiting in the courthouse for their eviction hearings. 65
The restriction on solicitation is especially harmful to poor people. The ABA
and numerous state legal needs studies have found that two primary reasons poor
persons do not seek legal assistance are because they are unaware of their legal
rights and potential solutions, and they do not know about the availability of free
legal assistance. 66 Congress's motivation for the ban may be the concern that in the
absence of a prohibition on solicitation, a legal services lawyer might encourage a
poor person to assert a legal right. However, the Supreme Court declared that
although providing a person with information about legal rights "might increase the
use of the judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for
a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action.,,67
The Supreme Court held that under the First Amendment, a state may not
prohibit an attorney seeking to advance political or ideological goals or to advance
association values from advising a person of their legal rights and offering free legal
assistance. 68 Similarly, rules of professional responsibility do not prohibit in-person
or live telephone solicitation where the attorneys' motivation is not pecuniary, nor

lost this source of funding after the 1996 restrictions were imposed); ALASKA ACCESS TO
CIVIL JUSTICE TASK FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (1999), available at
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/civjust.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA REPORT] (noting that Alaska
allows the prevailing party in a lawsuit to collect attorneys' fees and costs and that Alaska
Legal Services relied heavily on this as a source of funding before the 1996 restrictions were
imposed).
63 See LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(18); 45 C.F.R. § 1638.3 (2005).
64 Norton, supra note 40, at 611 n.31.
65 Office of Legal Affairs, Legal Servs. Corp., Interpretation of 45 CFR 1638, External
Ope EX-2003-1011, at 3 (2003), http://www.lsc.gov/laws/pdfs/olaeo/Ex-2003-1011.pdf. The
LSC regulations do allow public service announcements, legal presentations to groups that
request them, and informational brochures placed in clerk of court offices. 45 C.F.R. §
1638.4(a) (2005).
66 See LSC REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14 (explaining the results of seven state legal
needs studies); CONSORTIUM ONLEGALSERVS. & THE PUB., supra note 8, at 20-21.
67 Bates V. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977); see also Amy Busa & Carl G. Sussman,
Expanding the Market for Justice: Arguments for Extending In-Person Client Solicitation, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 487, 512-15 (1999) (arguing that the LSC restriction on the use of
private funds for solicitation is unconstitutional).
68 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414, 439 (1978); NAACP V. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428
29 (1963).
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do they prohibit other less direct forms of solicitation even where the motive is
pecuniary.69 Indeed, those ethics rules recognize that "[t]he giving of advice that one
should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the legal
profession to assist laypersons in recognizing legal problems.,,70 It is only federally
funded lawyers for the poor, whose clients are most in need of information on their
legal rights and available sources of free legal assistance,71 who stand gagged by the
LSC restriction on solicitation.
The final restriction on the means an LSC attorney may employ in representing
an indigent person addresses lobbying. When Congress first passed the LSC Act, it
prohibited legal services attorneys from attempting to influence legislation or any
executive order, but, respecting the professional independence of the attorney,
pennitted such activity when the attorney deemed it necessary for proper
representation of an eligible client.72 However, Congress subsequently banned
lobbying activities and today no LSC funds may be used to attempt to influence any
executive order or regulation, or the passage or defeat of any legislation. 73
For many clients, legislation or a regulation may be the only or most
appropriate relief, as well as the most efficient way, to address the client's needs. 74
The ABA's 2002 Standards for Providers of Civil Legal Services to the Poor stress
that effective resolution of a client's problem may call for an attorney to challenge
the offending law, policy, or practice through representation in administrative
rulemaking proceedings or before a legislative body.75 Indeed, having a voice in
legislative proceedings may be a more important means of legal representation for
poor clients than for the more affluent, since the poor tend not to vote as often and
are unable to influence elections and the legislative process through other means like
campaign contributions. 76 Yet, once again, Congress has denied LSC attorneys from

69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2003), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/rule_7_3.html [hereinafter MODEL RUlES].
70 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBll.ITY EC 2-3 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
71 The Supreme Court observed that "litigation may be the sole practicable avenue open
to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." Button, 371 U.S. at 430.
72 LSC Act § 1007(a)(5) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(5) (2000». The
1996 restrictions also prohibited LSC recipients from raising constitutional challenges to
welfare laws, but the Supreme Court held that this restriction violated the First Amendment
and it no longer applies to grantees. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
73 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(2); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.1 to .11 (2005). Recipients
may use non-LSC funds to respond to a written request from a government agency or official
for testimony, or information on existing or proposed legislation or regulations. 45 C.F.R. §
1612.6 (2005).
74 Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal Services Attorneys: Redefining
Professional Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 71-72, 77 (1994).
75 ABA STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF C~ LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 4, 92-95
standards 5.5-5.6 & cmts. (2002) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS].
76 "Most interest groups in the United States are organized as lobbies with paid staff.
Poor people, however, do not have [political action committee]s or access to other political
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providing the same means of legal representation available to clients of private
attorneys.
Perhaps most harmful to poor persons is that in 1996 Congress did not just
expand the restrictions on representing politically unpopular clients and causes by
denying LSC attorneys the legal methods often most effective in addressing tlle
problems faced by the poor, but it also banned LSC funds recipients from using
other funds for any purpose prohibited by Congress. Hence, no LSC-funded entity
can engage in any of the congressionally restricted activities, even if the activity is
77
funded by non-LSC monies from the state, private foundations, or the bar. In tum,
if an LSC-funded recipient transfers any funds to another person or entity, all of the
congressional restrictions "will apply both to the LSC funds transferred and to the
non-LSC funds of the person or entity to which those funds are transferred.,,78
As a result of these additional funding rules, congressional restrictions
encumber up to eighty-five percent of funding for civil legal services nationwide. 79
In twenty-one states, there is no legal service provider unencumbered by the
restrictions; in fourteen others, there is only one unrestricted civil legal assistance
entity.80
When the restrictions are considered as a whole, Congress's claimed effort
toward de-politicalization has actually been an attempt to protect the status quo and
reward special interests. 81 The result is that it is now much harder for the poor to get
an attorney, especially if they are a member of an unpopular group or if they are
asserting an unpopular claim, and it is harder for that attorney to be effective.
resources, and their communications with government are conventionally mediated through an
attorney." Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 21, at 37.
77 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(d)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3 (2005).
78 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7(a) (2005). However, if the funds are transferred to a bar
association, pro bono program, or private attorney solely for the purpose of funding private
attorney involvement in the delivery of legal assistance to eligible low-income clients, then the
restrictions shall apply only to the funds transferred. Id. § 1610.7(c); see also ide §§ 1614.1
to .7; infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
79 Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 881. For a list of studies noting the effects of the
federal restrictions, see ide at 875 n.3, 880 n.26. State and local governments have become
increasingly important sources of funding for legal assistance. ABA, INNOVATIVE
FuNDRAISING IDEAS FOR LEGAL SERVICES 115 (2004). In 2005, legal assistance funding from
state legislatures through appropriations and court fees and fines totaled over $163 million.
PERLS CHART, supra note 23; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, supra note 23. As of 2002,
legislative funding in eighteen states was encumbered by restrictions. BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, CHART OF RESTRICTIONS ON STAlE AND IOLTA FuNDING FOR CWIL LEGAL AID
(2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR. CHART].
80 Brief of the New York State Bar Ass'n et ale as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 23 n.8, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (Nos. 99-603 & 99-960)
(citing statistics compiled by the ABA and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
as of 2000); see also Rhode, supra note 9, at 388-89 ("In many jurisdictions, no non-federally
funded organizations are available to pursue restricted activities.").
81 See Greene et al., supra note 46, at 775.
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Although all members of the legal profession should strenuously object to such
restrictions, the next section demonstrates that lawyers actually have reinforced this
unequal treatment of the poor.

ill. THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Members of the legal profession in every state have responded to the
widespread unmet legal needs of low-income persons by developing fundraising and
volunteer lawyer programs to help provide free legal assistance. These programs
generally are run by the state supreme court or bar association, which usually define
who is eligible to receive the funds or other assistance and impose any restrictions on
their use. Although intended to help lower-income persons gain equal access to the
legal system, many of the programs developed or controlled by members of the bar
contain the same onerous restrictions on legal representation imposed by Congress
on recipients of LSC funds. In some bar legal assistance programs and in rules
relating to representation by law school clinics, members of the legal profession have
knowingly chosen to deny legal assistance or certain legal services to needy lower
income persons. In other situations, it appears that attorneys and judges have failed
to appreciate that their efforts to expand civil legal assistance actually have
reinforced Congress's denial of assistance. The net results of these actions by
attorneys are to further deny legal assistance to disfavored clients or causes and to
limit the effectiveness of legal representation for the poor.

A. Interest on Lawyer Trust Account Restrictions
Interest on Lawyer Trust Account ("IOLTA") programs exist in all states as a
means of generating funds for civil legal services for the poor. 82 Although five
IOLTA programs were created by state legislatures, the rest are established under the
authority and rules of the state supreme courts and run by committees of attorneys. 83
Under IOLTA, client funds that otherwise would not earn interest are pooled into
interest-bearing accounts; after bank fees are paid, the remaining funds are dedicated
to access-to-justice programs. 84 In 2005, IOLTA programs raised over $107 million
for legal assistance programs. 85
82 Brennan J. Torregrossa, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access
to Justice Foundation: Is There an Iota ofProperty Interest in IOLTA?, 42 VILL. L. REv. 189,
191 (1997); ABA, Commission on Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, What Is IOLTA?,
http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/iolta/ioltback.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter What Is IOLTA?].
83 ABA, Commission on Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, Status of IOLTA
Programs, http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/iolta/ioltus.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
84 What Is IOLTA?, supra note 82. In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of IOLTA programs against claims that they
violated clients' First and Fifth Amendment rights. 538 u.S. 216, 240-41 (2003). Even on the
issue of lobbying, the Supreme Court of Washington recently denied a proposal to prohibit the
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As of 2002, the rules governing at least fifteen IOLTA programs restrict access
to legal representation on grounds other than income or limit the legal services that
attorneys may provide to needy clients. 86 All fifteen prohibit the use of IOLTA funds
for lobbying, with at least three prohibiting any attempt to influence executive
branch rulemaking or orders. 87 These prohibitions apply even where the attorney
believes that lobbying is the most effective means of representation for that client. 88
Three state IOLTA programs mirror the federal congressional restriction on
participating in class action lawsuits. 89 Again, even if it is determined by the attorney
or another appropriate person that a class action is needed to bring relief to a large
group of otherwise unrepresented poor persons, no exception is made.
In addition to these restrictions, the IOLTA program in Texas prohibits the use
of funds for any lawsuit against a governmental entity unless the suit is on behalf of
an individual seeking to compel entitlement to government benefits. 90
Pennsylvania's IOLTA program includes a restriction prohibiting representation of a
person seeking an abortion and limits eligible clients to the elderly, disabled,
homeless, farm workers, or victims of crime or abuse. 91 New York's IOLTA rules do
not contain restrictions but critics charge that the oversight board has exercised its
use of IOLTA funds for lobbying, rejecting the argument that such use violates the First
Amendment rights of clients. In re Adoption of the New Set of Rilles of Profl Conduct and
Necessary Companion Amendments Thereto, No. 257oo-A-851 (Wash. July 10, 2006)
(including dissent to order on rules); see also Curt Woodward, Legal Services Firm, Farm
Bureau Face Off over Lobbying, ASSOCIAlED PREss, Aug. 5, 2006, available at 8/5/06
APALERTPOLITICS 20:44:51 (Westlaw).
85 PERLS CHART, supra note 23; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, supra note 23.
86 BRENNAN CTR. CHART, supra note 79. State IOLTA boards sometimes impose
restrictions on the use of funds by individual grantees even where the rules do not contain such
limits. See, e.g., Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts Program of the State of Delaware, Grant
Package (2007) (on file with author); E-mail fromSusanW.Corbin.DeI.BarFound.• to
author (July 14, 2(06) (on file with author).
87 BRENNAN CTR. CHART, supra note 79 (identifying lobbying restrictions in Alabama,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia). In contrast, the Washington
Supreme Court, at the urging of the Washington State Bar Association and Legal Foundation
of Washington (the entity administering the state's IOLTA program), recently rejected a
petition from the Washington State Farm Bureau to prohibit the use of IOLTA funds for
lobbying. Woodward, supra note 84; Letter from M. Janice Michels, Wash. State Bar Ass'n,
to Charles W. Johnson, Justice, Wash. Supreme Court (Jan. 23, 2(06) (on file with author);
Letter from Michael E. Schwab & Caitlin Davis Carlson, Legal Found. of Wash., to Charles
W. Johnson, Justice, Wash. Supreme Court (May 3,2(06) (on file with author).
88 Under South Carolina's IOLTA rules, lobbying any governmental body is prohibited
unless a waiver is obtained from IOLTA's Board of Directors. BRENNAN CTR. CHART, supra
note 79.
89 Id. (identifying class action restrictions in Maryland, Nevada, and Texas).
90Id.
91 I d.
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grant discretion to discourage or prevent challenges to government agencies and
representation of undocumented aliens. 92
Even if explicit IOLTA restrictions do not apply to the use of the funds, where
IOLTA access-to-justice funds are provided to an LSC grantee, the state IOLTA
funds become subject to the same broad array of restrictions imposed by Congress. 93
In some states, such as Arkansas, Missouri, and West Virginia, nearly all IOLTA
funds have been allocated to LSC grant recipients and are now effectively
encumbered with Congress's expansive restrictions. 94
Because of restrictions in some bar IOLTA programs, many poor clients that
have been cut off by Congress from federally funded legal representation also have
been denied representation through the very bar-sponsored programs whose stated
purpose is to expand the availability of much needed legal assistance to the state's
poor residents.

B. Restrictions on the Use ofBar Membership Dues
A growing number of state supreme courts or bar associations have increased
annual fees or dues to help fund free legal assistance for indigent residents or added
a line item on annual dues statements directing funds to legal assistance programs. 95
In some states these additional legal aid dues are mandatory, while in others
members are allowed to opt out of the additional dues or simply allowed to pay an
additional voluntary assessment to assist with access-to-justice programs. 96 As with
IOLTA programs, some state fees or dues programs restrict the poor clients or
causes that may benefit from the contribution, either by dedicating the funds to the
state's restricted IOLTA program or by directing all funds to LSC grantees who
cannot use the dues for any purpose prohibited by Congress. 97

92 See Victoria Rivkin, lOLA Funding Changes Prompt Attacks by Critics, N.Y. LJ.,
Mar. 20, 2000, at 1, 6; Randal C. Archibold, Funds Stopped for Legal Programs Helping
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,2001, at B6.
93 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3 (2005); LSC Appropriations Act § 504(d); BRENNAN ClR. FOR
JUSTICE, SlRUGGLING TO MEET THE NEED: COMMUNITIES CONFRONT GAPS IN FEDERAL
LEGALAID 18 (2003), available at http://www. brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/atj8.pdf.
94 BRENNANClR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 18-19.
95 National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Access to Justice Support Project, Bar
Dues Increase to Help Fund Legal Aid in West Virginia (2005); http://www.n1ada.org/CiviV
Civil_SPAN/SPAN_Library/document_list?state=WV (follow "West Virginia State Bar dues
increase to help fund legal aid" hyperlink); PERLS CHART, supra note 23. A number of
voluntary local bar associations also include bar due assessments for legal assistance. PERLS
CHART, supra note 23.
96 Pai, supra note 26, at 95 (discussing the mandatory fee increases); ABA, supra note
79, at 10-16 (describing efforts of state bars to increase attorney registration fees or dues to
fund legal services for the poor).
97 See, e.g., Supreme Court of Pa., Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust Account
Board (on file with author) (directing bar dues to restricted IOLTA program); TEx. EQUAL
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Some have questioned the appropriateness of using bar dues to support legal aid
programs. However, the Supreme Court held in Keller v. State Bar of California that
where dues are required as a condition of practicing law, the mandatory assessment
would not violate the bar member's First Amendment rights if the bar spends
members' dues on activities "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of
regulating the legal profession or 'improving the quality of the legal service available
to the people of the State.,,,98 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated, because
mandatory assessment funds "are specifically designated to provide direct legal
services to the poor, so as to maintain access to the justice system and improve the
quality of the legal services available for all the citizens of this state," they are
consistent with activities recognized as permissible under the state and federal
constitutions. 99 Thus, there should be no constitutional objection to using bar dues to
help provide access to legal representation to those without the financial means to
hire an attorney.

C. Restrictions on Law School Clinics
Law school clinics provide a significant amount of free legal assistance to the
poor and other unrepresented individuals and groups. Professor David Luban
estimated that with 1400 law clinic instructors and thousands of law students, clinics
at 182 law schools provide as many as three million hours of free legal work each
year for needy clients..100 On a number of occasions, attorneys have sought to prevent
law school clinics from providing assistance to controversial clients that otherwise
would go unrepresented.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND., RESlRICTIONS ON LEGAL SERVICES FuNDs IN TEXAS (2004),
http://www.teajf.orgigrants/docslFundin~Restrictions.pdf (detailing

restrictions on Texas
Basic Civil Legal Services Program funds); E-mail from Keith A. Birkes, Executive Dir., Mo.
Bar, to author (June 12, 2006) (on file with author) (stating that bar dues are distributed to
restricted LSC grantees); E-mail from Emily Jones, Access to Justice Div. Dir., State Bar of
Tex., to author (June 13, 2006) (on file with author) (stating that sixty-five dollars of the Texas
bar membership fee is deposited into the Basic Civil Legal Services Program Account).
98 Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,
843 (1961». The court further explained:
The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals
[of regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services] out
of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund
activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity.
Id.
99 In re Petition of the Wis. Trust Account Found., Inc., 2005 WI 35, 277 Wis. 2d xiii,
xvi (2005); see also Pai, supra note 26, at 95-97.
100 Luban, supra note 12, at 236 & n.108. Luban estimates that law schools invest around
$280 million annually in law clinics. Id. at 236 & n.107.
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In 1998, the Louisiana Supreme Court was urged by the governor, business
interests, and some prominent attorneys to curb the activities of the Tulane
University School of Law's Environmental Law Clinic. lOl The attorneys attacking
the clinic never showed how the clinic clients would find alternative representation.
They simply argued that it was not fair for businesses to have to defend lawsuits
brought by the clinic. l02 The state bar stood silent, refusing to take a position on the
appropriateness of restricting the ability of the state's law clinics to provide free
representation.103
Nevertheless, the justices of the court adopted new restrictions both on the
kinds of needy clients eligible for representation by the state's law clinics and on
how clinics can represent those clients. Among other new restrictions, the justices
mandated that law clinics in Louisiana may only represent clients who meet the
LSC's indigent guidelines (rather than simply showing that they cannot afford the
services of a private attorney), cannot represent any organization unless the clinic
certifies that at least fifty-one percent of the organization's members meet the LSC's
poverty guidelines, cannot represent any person if the clinic initiated contact for the
purpose of providing representation, and cannot appear in any representative
capacity before the legislature. 104 The chief justice of the court sought to justify the
restrictions by arguing that poor persons were not entitled to the same legal
representation as those who can afford private attorneys: "widespread advocacy
campaigns by professors and students are beyond the legal parameters of helping
indigent people.,,105 One commentator characterized the justices' actions as "the
equivalent of selectively disbarring attorneys who have won on controversial
matters.,,106
The attorney who represented the Louisiana Supreme Court when law clinics
and clinic clients challenged the new restrictions later sought to get the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to restrict the ability of law clinics to appear
before that court, but was unsuccessful. l07 Attorneys also have sought to restrict the
free legal services offered by law clinics at the University of Tennessee, University
of Oregon, and University of Pittsburgh law schools. l08 At the University of
101 See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 33,65-75 (2000) (noting the
efforts of the governor's special counsel and New Orleans attorneys). The author was the
director of the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic at the time of these events.
102 Id. at 66-69,121.
103 Id. at 70.
104 LA. SUP. CT. R. XX (Limited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work).
105 James Varney, Justice Calogero Seeking 3rd Term: Rough Campaign Is Anticipated,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 7, 1998, at A2.
106 Frank H. Wu, A Lesson in Power Politics, NAT'LLJ., May 3,1999, at A21.
107 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School
Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1971, 1985 (2003).
108 Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics ofAttacks on Environmental
Representation, 26 HARv. ENVlL. L. REv. 417, 425-26, 429-30 (2002).

2006]

UNDERMINING JUSTICE

1059

Pittsburgh, a state supreme court justice stepped into a controversy over the school's
environmental law clinic by characterizing the clinic's efforts to enforce planning
requirements in a federal environmental law as the inappropriate "teaching of
rudimentary social activism rather than law" and proposing that the clinic be shut
down. l09 In none of these instances did the state bar association defend the actions of
the law clinics or argue against imposing restrictions on the availability of legal
assistance to needy clients. 110
Even law school faculties have at times sought to limit the ability of law clinics
to provide free legal assistance to controversial cases or clients. At the University of
Oregon School of Law, some members of the faculty proposed shutting down the
school's environmental law clinic as a way to appease critics of the clinic. 111 At the
University of Tennessee, a young law professor active in controversial pro bono
environmental cases was denied tenure after being told that he "did not sufficiently
understand the moderation expected of Tennessee law professors."112
As a result of these and other attacks by attorneys on law school clinics, "some
law professors and law clinics have refused to represent certain cases or clients out
of fears that taking such cases could result in problems with their job security or
threats to their school's funding."113 In none of the instances where attorneys sought
to restrict the ability of needy clients to gain access to law clinic representation did
those attorneys provide an alternative source of representation. As one law professor
explained, attorneys attacking law clinics are upset because the clinics are "bringing
suits that wouldn't be brought at all if the clinic didn't do it."u4
D. Restrictions in Other Access to Legal Representation Initiatives

State supreme courts and bar associations have developed a number of
volunteer lawyer programs and innovative initiatives to raise funds for legal services
such as lawyer-sponsored foundations, cy pres awards, and pro hac vice fees. A
significant number of these pro bono and funding programs restrict the legal
assistance provided to poor persons.
109 Letter from Ralph J. Cappy, Justice, Supreme Court of Pa., to William V. Luneburg,
Professor, Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law (Oct. 2, 2(01) (on file with author).
110 See Kuehn, supra note 108, at 425-32.
111 Alan Pittman, UO Environmental Law Clinic Funding Axed, WHAT'S HAPPENING?
(Eugene, Or.), Sept. 2, 1993, at 1.
112 E-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Boston ColI. of Law, to author (Sept. 17,
2(01) (on file with author); E-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Boston ColI. of Law, to
author (Sept. 13, 2(01) (on file with author).
113 Kuehn, supra note 108, at 431; see also Luban, supra note 12, at 240 (arguing that
even if the previous attacks on clinics failed, "they were near misses, and eventually some will
succeed. Indeed, they may already have succeeded in one of their aims, because clinic
directors will undoubtedly hesitate before taking on volatile cases that may provoke dangerous
backlash against the clinics or their law schools").
114 A.F. Conard, "Letter from the Law Clinic," 26 J. LEGAL Enuc. 194,204 (1974).
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Lawyer-sponsored contributions can involve either one-time or annual
solicitations of donations from lawyers or law firms toward free legal assistance for
the poor. These programs are present in most states and provide significant financial
assistance to LSC offices and other providers of free legal assistance. IIS In 2005, the
legal profession contributed over $57 million to legal assistance programs through
attorney fee registration funds, bar dues assessments, pro hac vice fees, or other
lawyer or bar association donations. 116
Although information is not available on the extent of any restrictions on the
use of these funds, grant guidelines or discretionary decisions on individual grant
awards for these programs may impose some of the same restrictions on the use of
the funds as those imposed by Congress on LSC funds, either by explicitly excluding
some clients or means of representation, or by indirectly incorporating restrictions in
the state IOLTA or other program to which the funds are dedicated. Moreover,
where the funds are provided to recipients of LSC grants, those private bar funds
may not be used for any purpose or activity prohibited by Congress. 117
Unclaimed class action awards or criminal restitution funds are often
distributed using the doctrine of cy pres by directing the residuals to another use that
still furthers the objectives of the underlying award or fund. 118 In a nurrlber of cases,
these cy pres awards have gone to legal organizations and law school clinics to help
advance their legal assistance programs, including awards of up to $2 million. 119
Courts controlling cy pres funds look to the attorneys in the case for direction
on how best to distribute the residual funds and for nominations of appropriate
recipients. As with other discretionary decisions to distribute funds for legal
assistance to the poor, judges and attorneys in these cases may, either consciously or

115 ABA & NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
PAR1NERSHIPS STATE BY STATE 29-31 (2005) [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE
PAR1NERSHIPS] (providing examples of successful lawyer fundraising programs in Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); ABA, supra note 79, at 3-9,29
33 (providing similar examples in Atlanta, Boston, Columbus, Nashville, Oregon, Texas,
Utah, and West Virginia). The National Legal Aid and Defender Association estimates that
bar campaigns for civil legal assistance exist in nearly one hundred communities. National
Legal Aid & Defender Association, Civil Resources, IOLTA & Other Funding,
http://www.nlada.org/CiviVCivil_ IOLTAlIOLTA_Bar (last visited Nov. 14,2(06).
116 PERLS CHART, supra note 23; E-mail from Meredith McBurney, supra note 23.
117 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text; see also ACCESS TO JUSTICE
PARlNERSHIPS, supra note 115, at 30 (explaining that lawyer foundation funds in Colorado
and Delaware were distributed to LSC grantees).
118 Pai, supra note 26, at 93.
119 I d. at 94-95 (identifying cy pres awards for legal assistance in California, Illinois, and
New York); see also ACCESS TO JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 115, at 29 (providing
similar examples from Minnesota, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington);
ABA, supra note 79, at 45-49 (providing similar examples from Illinois, Oregon, and
Washington).
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inadvertently, restrict the use of these funds either by directing the funds to another
program (such as IOLTA) with existing restrictions or to a restricted LSC grant
recipient.
Pro hac vice fees paid by out-of-state lawyers to appear in state courts are
another newer source of funding for civil legal assistance. 12o Where the proceeds of
those fees are controlled by the state supreme COurt/ 21 the court must consider, as
with the other innovative funding programs above, if it is appropriate to restrict the
use of those funds or if providing the funds to some legal assistance providers may
encumber those pro hac vice proceeds with the congressional LSC restrictions.122
A final area where the legal profession may be reinforcing congressional
restrictions on access to legal representation is through volunteer lawyer or other pro
bono programs ("VLPs"). The ABA estimates there are over 900 pro bono programs
referring civil matters for lower-income persons to private attorneys.123 As many as
150,000 private attorneys are registered to participate in LSC-funded pro bono
programs. 124 Those familiar with pro bono programs believe that proportionally few
serve the residual poor clients that are prohibited by Congress from representation,
in part because the programs often obtain referrals or funds from the local LSC
office and, consequently, tend to follow the office's restrictions.125

120 ACCESS TO JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 115, at 28 (identifying pro hac vice
fees as funding sources for legal aid in Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and
Texas); ABA, supra note 79, at 25-27 (identifying Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, and Texas
as using pro hac vice fees to fund legal services).
121 In some states, the legislature, rather than the state supreme court, may dictate how
pro hac vice fees may be used. In Texas, for example, the legislature has directed that the fees
be deposited into the restricted Basic Civil Legal Services account. See generally TEx. EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND., supra note 97.
122 See, e.g., E-mail from Keith A. Birkes, supra note 97 (explaining that all of
Missouri's pro hac vice fees go to LSC recipients).
123 SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 6.
124 ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POllCY, CWIL LEGAL AID IN THE
UNITED STAlES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM IN 2003, at 3 (2003), available at http://
www.clasp.orglpublicationslLegal_Aid_2003.pdf.
125 E-mail from Linda Lund, Volunteer Lawyers Program, Ala. State Bar, to author (June
7,2006) (on file with author) (estimating that a majority of pro bono programs are run by the
LSC-funded program in the state); E-mail fromCherylZalenski.ABACtr.forProBono.to
author (July 24, 2006) (on file with author) (explaining that over thirty-five percent of the 932
pro bono programs in the ABA's database appear to receive LSC funding in some form); E
mail from Cheryl Zalenski, ABA Ctr. for Pro Bono, to author (July 14, 2006) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Zalenski July 14 E-mail] (opining that, based on anecdotal evidence,
proportionally few pro bono programs handle LSC-restricted cases); see, e.g., Delaware
Volunteer Legal Services, http://www.dvls.orgl (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (not providing
representation for any class action); Houston Volunteer Lawyers Program, Do You Qualify?,
http://www.houstonlegalhelp.orgldoyouqualify.asp (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (not providing
representation to any incarcerated person); Mobile Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers
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Attorneys nlnning these VLPs need to understand that ineligible LSC clients
can be referred by an LSC office to pro bono attorneys without subjecting the
program to congressional restrictions. For example, the LSC restriction on assistance
for certain aliens states that none of the funds appropriated by Congress may be used
to provide "legal assistance for or on behalf of any alien.,,126 The implementing
regulations explicitly state that "legal assistance does not include normal intake and
referral services.,,127 Therefore, where the LSC office does the intake for the VLP,
some programs have likely been excluding aliens who are not otherwise prevented
by Congress from receiving that voluntary assistance.
Prisoners likewise can be referred by LSC grantees to VLPs. Congress prohibits
funds to any person or entity "that participates in any litigation on behalf of a person
incarcerated in a Federal, State or local prison."128 By simply referring a prisoner to a
pro bono program, the LSC grant recipient does not participate in litigation.
Therefore, LSC grantees can and should refer prisoners through their normal intake
and referral services to pro bono programs.
The same is true for persons who are ineligible for legal representation in a
public housing eviction proceeding because of a drug charge. Congress has only
prohibited funding an entity "that defends a person in a proceeding to evict the
person from a public housing project.,,129 Because an intake referral of a person
charged with a drug crime to a pro bono program would not constitute defending that
person in an eviction proceeding, VLPs that rely on LSC grantees for intake and
referral should receive referrals of and provide legal assistance to such persons.
Although it appears that Congress's restrictions would disallow VLPs who
receive LSC funds from aiding certain clients at all, in fact VLPs may match these
LSC ineligible clients with private pro bono attorneys even if the program receives
"private attorney involvement" ("PAr') funds from an LSC grantee. Generally, a
recipient of LSC funding must devote at least twelve-and-one-half percent of the
annual award to the involvement of private attorneys in the delivery of legal services
to the poor. 130 Many state VLPs receive PAI funds to help finance their programs. 131
Although a transfer of LSC funds to another entity usually requires the entity
receiving the transferred funds to comply with all of the congressional restrictions,
an exception is made for transfers of PAI funds. LSC regulations specify that where
funds are transferred to bar associations, pro bono programs, private attorneys, or
law firms for the sole purpose of funding PAI activities, the congressional

Program, http://www.vlpmobile.org/ (follow "download the Application and Eligibility
Form" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (not providing representation to aliens).
126 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(II); 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2005).
127 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2005).
128 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(15); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1637.3 (2005).
129 LSC Appropriations Act § 504(a)(17); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1633.3 (2005).
130
45 C.F.R. § 1614.1(a) (2005).
131 Zalenski July 14 E-mail, supra note 125 (identifying over thirty-five percent of the
932 pro bono programs in the country as receiving LSC funding in some form).
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restrictions apply only to the funds transferred and not to all of the programs or
funds of the private attorney recipient. 132 Thus, a VLP may accept PAl funds without
having to comply with the congressional restrictions imposed on LSC funds in
general, provided the VLP also is funded from other non-LSC sources.
Between the ability of LSC grantees to engage in intake and referral activities
even for ineligible clients and the ability of VLPs to accept PAl funding without
having to comply with the LSC restrictions, the lawyer programs should not allow
the congressional restrictions to discourage them from providing free legal assistance
to any needy person. As noted above, because in many places there are no non-LSC
funded organizations to represent persons or causes restricted by Congress,133 it is
particularly important that VLPs, and indeed all programs sponsored by or assisted
by the bar, be available to provide such assistance. Otherwise, certain groups may be
completely cut off from legal assistance and the ability to obtain equal justice under
the law.
In all legal assistance programs created or controlled by the legal profession, the
judges and attorneys involved must keep in mind that the restrictions imposed by
Congress on LSC grantees do not reflect objective decisions about the neediest poor
clients, the most significant legal needs of the poor, or the most appropriate legal
methods for attaining a client's goals. Instead, as outlined above in Part II, those
restrictions on clients, causes, and methods of legal representation are political and
ideological judgments reflecting hostility toward certain controversial clients and
causes. Thus, in adopting restrictions that Congress has imposed on LSC grantees,
members of the legal profession are not objectively directing the funds to those most
in need or to where the funds will be most beneficial. Furthermore, as the next
section argues, professional norms prohibit attorneys from condoning efforts to deny
legal assistance to any unpopular clients or causes.

N. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S INvOLVEMENT IN
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The principles of the legal profession strongly promote unrestricted access to
legal representation for all persons unable to afford the assistance of an attorney. The
concept of equal access to the justice system has been repeatedly and forcefully
stated by ethics rules, ethics opinions, the organized bar, and notions of
professionalism. By making it clear that attorneys must uphold the ideal of equal
access, it follows that the legal profession should play no part in conditioning the
availability of legal assistance or the type of legal assistance rendered on any criteria
other than objective resource allocation or legal needs.

132
133

4 5 C.F.R. § 1610.7 (2005).
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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A. Ethical Precepts Advance Unrestricted Access to Legal Representation
The legal profession's commitment to equal access to legal representation is
reflected in the ethical precepts governing the profession. The ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), the basis for ethics rules in forty-six states
and the District of Columbia, states in the preamble that:
A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice
and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor,
cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should
devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure
equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal
counsel.134
The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), the
primary source for ethics rules until the adoption of the Model Rules and still the
basis for ethics rules in two states, similarly declares that "every person in our
society should have ready access to the independent professional services of a
lawyer of integrity and competence" and reminds lawyers that an important function
of the profession is to "assist in making legal services fully available.,,135
This commitment to access to legal representation is reflected in ethics rules
creating the duty on all individual lawyers to help those unable to afford an attorney.
The Model Rules both create a professional responsibility on every lawyer to
provide legal services to those unable to pay and direct every lawyer to support
government and bar programs that provide free legal services to persons of limited
financial means. 136 The Model Code states that "[a] lawyer should assist the legal
profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available," and enjoins every

134 MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at pmbl. 1 6, available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html; see ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/rnrpc/alpha_states.
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (listing the states that have adopted the Model Rilles).
135 MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 1-1, 2-1. New York and Ohio presently follow
the Model Code, while California and Maine have not adopted either the Model Code or the
Model Rules. ABAlBNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3-4 (2006).
Ohio is dropping its Model Code-based standards and will replace them with a version of the
Model Rilles on February 1, 2007. ABAlBNA, In Switch to Model Rules, Ohio Adopts MJP
but Keeps Unique Standards from Prior Code, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 389 (2006).
136 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 6.1 & cmts. 1, 10. The Model Rilles add that
"[l]aw firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide
the pro bono legal services called for by this Rille." Id. at R. 6.1 cmt. 11.
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lawyer to support efforts to meet the need for legal services of those unable to pay
for an attomey.137
The Model Rules are particularly strong in condemning any denial of legal
representation based on the identity of the client or cause: "Legal representation
should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose
cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval."138 The Model Code
likewise states that representation should not be declined "because a client or cause
is unpopular or community reaction is adverse" or "to avoid adversary alignment
against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of the
community."139
Ethics rules clarify that representation of a client, as well as a lawyer's or the
bar's role in making legal representation fully available to all needy persons, "does
not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.,,14o This position is reinforced by a comment in the Restatement
of Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement") that "it is a tradition that a lawyer's
advocacy for a client should not be construed as an expression of the lawyer's
personal views.,,141
The Model Rules go even further and declare that individual lawyers have an
obligation to represent the kinds of unpopular clients that are denied assistance by
some legal aid programs: "All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro
bono publico service . . . . An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by
accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients.,,142 An
ABA report on professional responsibility argued that one of the highest services the
bar can render to society is to represent the very clients and causes that are
disfavored by Congress or the public. 143 Hence, in the view of ethics rules and the
ABA, ensuring that a full range of legal services is available to all needy persons is

137 MODEL CODE,

supra note 70, at Canon 2, EC 2-25.
supra note 69, at R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
139 MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-27, 2-28.
140 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 1.2(b) & cmt. 5 ("By the same token,
representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities."); see also
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 7-17 (noting that an attorney "may take positions on
public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the individual views of any
client").
141 RESTA1EMENT (THlRD) OF LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. e (2000)
[hereinafter RESTA1EMENT].
142 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 6.2 cmt. 1. The Model Code explains that
furtherance of the bar's objective to make legal services fully available "requires acceptance
by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to him and
the bar generally." MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-26.
143 Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216
(1958) (reprinting report of the ABA and Association of American Law Schools Joint
Conference on Professional Responsibility).
138 MODEL RUlES,
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neither a political statement by an attorney or the bar nor an endorsement of that
person's positions. It is simply a commitment to equal access to legal representation.
In addition to condemning any effort to deny legal services to unpopular clients
or causes, ethics rules aim to ensure that all lawyers exercise independent
professional judgment in determining the best means to meet each client's
objectives 144 and "take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.,,145 The Restatement warns that lawyers who
are paid to represent indigent clients must ensure they will exercise the same
independent professional judgment that other attorneys must traditionally follow in
determining how best to represent a client. 146 By nowhere suggesting that the legal
services provided to the poor should be in any way different from those provided to
the rich, ethics precepts thereby proscribe efforts by attorneys to restrict the means
by which a poor person can be represented.
As a final ethics prescript, both the Model Rules and the Model Code prohibit
"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.,,147 The fair
administration of justice requires the availability of legal representation and the
ability of that person's lawyer to make unrestricted decisions about how best to serve
the client.148 Professors Ted Finman and Theodore Schneyer have argued that the
proscription on conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice could be
invoked to prohibit board members of a legal services office from basing client
representation considerations on the identity of adverse parties or the controversial
nature of the subject matter. 149 A similar argument could be made against members
of the bar that support restrictions in bar legal assistance programs.

144 See MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at R. 2.1, 1.8(t), 5.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note
70, at Canon 5.
145 MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
146 REsTAlEMENT, supra note 141, § 134 cmt. g.
147 MODEL RUlES, supra note 69, at R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at DR
1-102(A)(5).
148 See MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 8-3 (''The fair administration of justice
requires the availability of competent lawyers . . . . Those persons unable to pay for legal
services should be provided needed services.").
149 Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in
Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REv. 67, 135 (1981); see also Leora Harpaz,
Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights ofAttorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 49, 58 n.44 (1998) ("An argument can be made that the refusal to represent a client in
a situation where no other competent attorney is available might impact on the integrity of the
judicial process."). An attorney may violate this rule even though the conduct does not take
place in court or affect an ongoing proceeding. CrR. FOR PROF'L REs PONS ffi ll.ITY, ABA,
ANNOTAlED MODEL RUlES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 614 (5th ed. 2(03).
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B. Ethics Opinions Condemn Restrictions on Access to Legal Representation
Ethics opinions repeatedly condemn efforts to restrict the clients or causes that
legal assistance programs may represent. The earliest relevant ABA opinion
addressed a proposal by a state law school to develop case acceptance guidelines that
would help avoid lawsuits against government officials or suits that 'were
controversial on social or political grounds. In Informal Opinion 1208, the ABA's
ethics committee held that the lawyer-members of the governing board of a legal aid
clinic "should seek to avoid establishing guidelines (even though they state only
broad policies; see Formal Opinion 324 15°) that prohibit acceptance of controversial
clients and cases or that prohibit acceptance of cases aligning the legal aid clinic
against public officials, governmental agencies or influential members of the
community."151 Instead, the lawyers "should seek to establish guidelines that
encourage, not restrict, acceptance of controversial clients and cases, and this is
particularly true if laymen may be unable otherwise to obtain legal services.,,152
The ethics committee was particularly concerned that legal aid or volunteer
lawyer programs are often the last lawyers in town for indigent persons, arguing that
the "[u]se of guidelines that avoid controversial cases and controversial clients is
particularly unfortunate if the organization happens to be the only local organization
providing aid to indigents.,,153 The Supreme Court in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez also recognized that restrictions on how a lawyer may represent a client
are more problematic when the client is an indigent person because there often will
be no alternative source of assistance for interference with constitutional and
statutory rightS. 154
ABA Formal Opinion 334 addressed efforts to restrict the activities of legal
services attorneys. The opinion held that activities on behalf of clients "may be
limited or restricted only to the extent necessary to allocate fairly and reasonably the
resources of the office and establish proper priorities in the interest of making
maximum legal services available to the indigent."155 Case priorities "may not be
See infra note 155.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Infonnal Op. 1208 (1972) (quoting
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-28, 2-29) (footnote added). "Acceptance of such
controversial clients and cases by legal aid clinics is in line with the highest aspirations of the
bar to make legal services available to all." Id.
152 d.
1
153 1d.
154 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001). ''Thus, with respect to the litigation services Congress has
funded, there is no alternative channel for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to
restrict." Id. at 546-47.
155 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Fonnal Ope 334 (1974) [hereinafter
Fonnal Op. 334]. Fonnal Opinion 334 clarified and superseded Fonnal Opinion 324, which
had similarly held that members of a legal services board "should strenuously attempt to fulfill
their broad obligations under Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by setting
policies designed to make legal services as fully available to all who need them as resources
150

151
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based on considerations such as the identity of the prospective adverse parties or the
nature of the remedy ('class action') sought to be employed.,,156 Although limited
resources may require some allocations of funds, it must be done "fairly and
reasonably with the objective of making maximum legal services available, within
the limits of available resources.,,157 Limitations stemming from motives inconsistent
with the obligation of the bar to make legal services fully available to indigent
persons "are always improper."158
Formal Opinion 334 is also important in reiterating that all lawyers, not just
those serving on a legal aid board, "should use their best efforts to avoid the
imposition of any unreasonable and unjustified restraints upon the rendition of legal
services by legal services offices for the benefit of the indigent and should seek to
remove such restraints where they exist.,,159 ABA Formal Opinion 399, which
addressed the 1996 congressional restrictions, stated a similar obligation on all
attomeys.160 It argued that until Congress reverses the restrictions, the legal
profession must support organizations not funded by LSC where they exist and help
establish them where they do not. 161 In particular, the opinion calls on lawyers to
step forward and provide pro bono service to "those whose cases or strategies are
prohibited" by Congress's LSC restrictions. 162 ABA Formal Opinion 347 also
reiterated the legal profession's "clear responsibility" to take all necessary steps to
prevent the abandonment of indigent clients that can no longer be served by LSC
offices. 163
Amo;ng state and local ethics opinions, a 1996 Utah opinion on the proposed
LSC restrictions advised that all members of the bar have an ethical duty to assist in

permit" and "not to reject certain types of clients or particular kinds of cases merely because
of their controversial nature, anticipated adverse community reaction, or because of a desire to
avoid alignment against public officials, governmental agencies, or influential merrlbers of the
community." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 324 (1970) (citing
MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC 2-25, 2-27, 2-28).
156 Formal Ope 334, supra note 155 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 70, at EC-l).
157 Id. Informal Opinion 1359 similarly sanctioned a priority system or other caseload
limitation only "if it is a fair and reasonable method of making maximum legal services
available to the indigent and not inconsistent with the Code." ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Profl Responsibility, Informal Ope 1359 (1976).
158 Formal Ope 334, supra note 155
159Id.

Formal Ope 399, supra note 21.
See ide
162 Id.
163 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 347 (1981). "If these
traditional principles of our profession are to be accepted as more than hollow rhetoric,
lawyers in every jurisdiction acting through the organized bar should take all necessary actions
to prevent the abandonment of indigent clients." Id.
160

161
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the provision of legal services to persons adversely affected by the restrictions. 164
The Bar Association of the City of New York, in a lengthy report on the 1996
congressional restrictions, characterized the limitations on how a lawyer may
represent a client as "inconsistent with the ethical norms designed to assure the
quality of those [legal] services . . . and inconsistent with our nation's historic
realization that the autonomy and independence of the Bar is a powerful force for
securing the rule of law.,,165 The association urged the repeal or invalidation of the
1996 congressional restrictions.

C. The Legal Profession's Other Commitments to Equal Access
Beyond ethics rules and opinions, the organized bar, and in particular the ABA,
have expressed a strong commitment to providing equal access to legal
representation. In 2000, the ABA's House of Delegates listed as one of the six core
values of the legal profession "the lawyer's duty to promote access to justice.,,166
Similarly, the ABA's widely publicized MacCrate Report on professional
development identified "Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality" as one
of the profession's four fundamental values. 167 That fundamental value includes
ensuring that adequate legal services are provided to those unable to pay.168 The
ABA and the American Association of Law Schools ("AALS") also have recognized
the duty of lawyers to provide representation to unpopular clients and causes,
observing that the legal profession "has a clear moral obligation" to ensure their
representation.169
Recently, the president of the ABA called for "a recommitment to the noblest
principles that define our profession: providing legal representation to the poor,
disadvantaged and underprivileged; and performing public service that enhances the
common goOd.,,170 Similarly, members of the American Inns of Court pledge to

164 Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Ope No. 96-07, 1996 WL 509207,
at *2 (Aug. 30, 1996).
165 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 21, at 59.
166 L. Harold Levinson, Collaboration between Lawyers and Others: Coping with the
ABA Model Rules After Resolution 10F, 36 WAKE FORESTL. REv. 133 app., at 164-65 (2001)
(citing to resolution 10F, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 2000).
167 SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 140 (1992) [hereinafter
MACCRATE REPORT].
168 Id.
169 Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 143, at 1217;
see also Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REp. 133 (1953) (reprinting
an ABA resolution declaring the bar's duty to provide all persons, even the most unpopular
persons, the benefit of legal representation).
170 Michael S. Greco, A Renaissance ofIdealism: A Lawyer's Gift of Time and Expertise
Can Change a Needy Client's World, A.B.A. J., September 2005, at 6, 6. Among the ABA's
goals is "to promote meaningful access to legal representation and the American system of
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"work to make the legal system more accessible, responsive and effective.,,171 State
bar associations have echoed this commitment to equal access to legal
representation. 172
The ABA also contends that lawyers for the poor should provide their clients
the full range of necessary legal services. The ABA's 2006 Principles of a State
System for the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid makes clear that civil legal aid should be
provided to those that "cannot be served through federally funded programs for
reasons such as their income level, immigration status or because they are
incarcerated" and that a full range of legal services should be provided to low
income populations including "extended representation in complex litigation and on
systemic issues; and representation before state and local legislative and
administrative bodies.,,173 The ABA's 2002 Standards for Providers of Civil Legal
Services to the Poor specify that organizations providing civil legal assistance to the
poor should provide for lobbying before administrative and legislative bodies.
Standard 5.5 states that "[i]f representation before an administrative body regarding
adoption of rules . . . is appropriate to achieve client objectives, a legal services
provider should strive to provide such representation."174 Standard 5.6 similarly
provides that "[i]f representation before a legislative body is appropriate to achieve
client objectives, a legal services provider should strive to provide such
representation,"175 noting that in some situations legislative action may be the most

justice for all persons regardless of their economic or social condition." ABA, ABA Mission
and Association Goals, http://www.abanet.org/aboutlgoals.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
171 American Inns of Court, Professional Creed, http://www.innsofcourt.org/Contentl
Default.aspx?Id=141 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
172 See, e.g., amo SUP. CT. R. app. V, available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rules/
govbar ("I shall strive to improve the law and our legal system and to make the law and our
legal system available to al1."); S.C. BAR STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 2.2 (1999),
available at http://www.scbar.org/member/documents/professionalism_standards.pdf ("A
lawyer should provide or assist and defend efforts to provide all persons with just causes,
regardless of their means or the popularity of their cause, to full and fair access to the law and
to the judicial system."); The Florida Bar, Ideals and Goals of Professionalism,
http://www.1aw.stetson.edu/excellence/litethics/flbar.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2006) (stating
that lawyer professionalism includes contributing one's skill, knowledge and influence as a
lawyer to "efforts to provide all persons, regardless of their means or popularity of their
causes, with access to the law and the judicial system"); The Texas Center for Legal Ethics
and Professionalism, The Texas Lawyer's Creed, A Mandate for Professionalism,
http://www.txethics.org/reference_creed.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) ("I am responsible to
assure that all persons have access to competent representation regardless of wealth or position
in life.").
173 TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, ABA, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGAlES No. 112B, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaidl
downloads/06A112B.pdf.
174 ABA STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS, supra note 75, at 17.
175 [d.

2006]

UNDERMINING JUSTICE

1071

efficient, or even the only, means to resolve the client's problem. 176 The fact that
lobbying may be "controversial should not be a barrier to a practitioner pursuing
it.,,177 The practice restrictions in a number of bar-supported legal assistance
programs, therefore, are directly contrary to the ABA Standards.
Thus, the organized bar's position is clear-the legal profession has a duty to
promote legal representation for all those who cannot afford an attorney, and that
representation should include the full range of legal services traditionally provided
by an attorney.
Lawyer oaths reinforce the obligation to promote equal access to legal
representation. When the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics as its fust
statement of ethical principles in 1908, the organization also adopted a proposed
oath of admission setting forth the "general principles which should ever control the
lawyer in the practice of his profession" and "duties which they are sworn on
admission to obey and for the willful violation of which disbarment is provided.,,178
Among those seven duties, a lawyer swears to "never reject, from any consideration
personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed."179 Oaths committing
attorneys not to reject the cause of the defenseless or oppressed exist today in eleven
states;180 statutes or court rules in at least eight more states create a similar obligation
on attorneys.181 Although this duty only constrains the lawyer from personally
rejecting a defenseless or oppressed person, it reinforces the responsibility of that
lawyer to avoid assisting in actions that deny legal assistance to unpopular clients or
causes.
Judges have a special role in protecting and promoting access to legal
representation. As the president of the ABA explained: "The Constitution establishes
the fundamental right of access to the judicial system. The courts, as guardians of
every person's individual rights, have a special responsibility to protect and enforce

176
177

I d. at 94 standard 5.6 cmt.
I d. at 4.

178

Oath ofAdmission, 33 A.B.A. REp. 584, 584-85 (1908).

179

I d. at 585. The oath was derived from a similar pledge in the 1850 Field Code, which

was adopted by at least seventeen states to govern the admission and discipline of lawyers.
Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for lAwyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L.
REv. 1385, 1424-26, 1440 (2004).
180 Carol Rice Andrews, Oaths Based on the Field Code Duties (2006) (unpublished
survey) (on file with author) (identifying oath provisions in Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin).
181 See Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of lAw
Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REv. 253, 278 nn.139-40 (2003) (citing to statutory duties
in Alabama, California, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oregon); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, §
3 (2006); ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 41(h). Violation of an oath or statutory duty is grounds for
disciplinary action. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 2006); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 37-61-301(2)(b) (2006); WASH. REv. CODE § 2.48.220(3) (2006).
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the right of equal access to the judicial system.,,182 The Conference of Chief Justices,
which includes the highest judicial officer of each state and the District of Columbia,
has stated that the promise of equal justice under law is not realized for those with
no meaningful access to the justice system. I83 The conference resolved that judges
should develop and support civil legal services for individuals and families without
access and "take action necessary to ensure access to the justice system for those
who face impediments they are unable to surmount on their own.,,184 Similarly, the
American Judges Association has resolved that a major goal of all judges should be
to provide and protect access to justice for people who are poor, elderly, or who have
disabilities.185
As Judge Judith Billings of the Utah Court of Appeals explained, 'judges have
a special opportunity, and obligation, to use their positions to provide access to our
justice system.,,186 Therefore, judges, as guarantors of equal justice, should be
particularly vigilant in ensuring that no program of the court excludes certain

182 Robert J. Grey, Jr., Access to the Courts: Equal Justice for All, EJOURNAL USA:
ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY, August 2004, at 6, 9, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0804/ijde/
ijde0804.pdf; see also CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS pmbl. § 2 (1924) ("Courts exist to
promote justice, and thus to serve the public interest."); Hon. Judith Billings & Jenny M.
McMahon, Expanding Pro Bono: The Judiciary's Power to Open Doors, DIALOGUE, Spring
1998, at 1, 1 (''The judiciary has a special responsibility to insure access to justice.").
183 Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements & Resolutions, Resolution 23:
Leadership to Promote Equal Justice (2001), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/accesstojusticeresolutions/
resoI23Ieadership.html.
184 Id. The chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that the judicial
branch is responsible for "offering everyone equal access to justice." Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. LJ.
3, 4 (2003). The executive director of the Vermont Bar Association asserts that "[b]ar
associations and the judiciary share in the responsibility to insure access to justice." Robert M.
Paolini, Pro Bono Is Better than Pro Se, VT. BJ. & L. DIG., June 1998, at 7,7.
185 American Judges Association, Judicial Concerns Resolutions, Resolution on Access
to Justice and Protection of the Rights of People (Sept. 25, 1997), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/
resolutions/aboutaja-resolutions-judicialconcerns.htm. The Honorable John N. Kirkendall,
past chair of the National Conference of Specialized Court Judges, similarly noted: ''Today, I
am aware of no serious argument among scholars or others that judges should be exempt from
participation in improving the profession by continually working toward the goal of making
available legal services for everyone in our society." John N. Kirkendall, The Judiciary and
Pro Bono-How May We Help?, 70 MICH. B.J. 912, 912 (1991).
186 Judith Billings, Using the Judiciary to Promote Pro Bono Activity, DIALOGUE,
Summer 1997, at 14, 14. Judge Robert McBeth of Washington argues that judges must
actively promote equal access to legal representation: "Access to justice should be a
fundamental concern of every judge in the country. We can no longer sit on the sidelines and
'let the lawyers do their thing'-we need to take positive steps to ensure that our system of
justice is fair to all participants." Robert E. McBeth, Judicial Activism, JUDGES' J., Winter
2001, at 12, 13,40.
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persons or causes from obtaining legal assistance or restricts what a lawyer for the
poor might do on behalf of her client.
The final relevant professional norms apply to law school professors. Law
professors who are members of the bar are subject to the same legal profession
ethical precepts as other attorneys in the jurisdiction where the professor is admitted,
even if the professor is not engaged in the active practice of law. 187
Beyond ethics rules, the professional norms of the legal academy promote
unrestricted access to legal representation. Both the ABA and the AALS argue that
because law professors function as important role models for law students, they
should be guided by the highest standards of ethics and professionalism and "should
assist students to recognize the responsibility of lawyers to advance individual and
social justice.,,188 The ABA's MacCrate Report reiterated this same responsibility:
"Law school deans, professors, administrators and staff should be concerned to
convey to students that the professional value of the need to 'promote justice,
fairness and morality' is an essential ingredient of the legal profession."189 The
AALS goes even further, stating that the financial freedom a law professor enjoys
from not having to serve the interests of private clients creates "an enhanced
obligation to pursue individual and social justice."190
187 In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 1988) (rejecting the contention that a law
professor's ethical obligations and professional responsibilities only apply when representing a
client); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Ope 336 (1974) (holding that
a lawyer must comply at all times with the rules of conduct, even if the lawyer is not acting in
a professional capacity).
188 AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (2003), in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS 2006 HANDBOOK 91,92 (2006), available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_
sgp_eth.php [hereinafter Statement of Good Practices]; see also COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONAUSM, ABA, " ... IN THE SPIRIT OF PuBuc SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
REKINDUNG OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 19 (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 268
(1987).
189 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 167, at 333. "Law school deans, professors,
administrators and staff must not only promote these values by words, but must so conduct
themselves as to convey to students that these values are essential ingredients of our
profession." Id. at 236. ''The sense that professors are uniquely situated to model a
commitment to justice and the public interest-and their moral obligation to do so--should be
largely beyond dispute." Thomas D. Morgan, lAw Faculty as Role Models, in TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 37, 47 (1996).
190 Statement of Good Practices, supra note 188. The ABA's law school accreditation
standards require law schools to establish polices that address a full-time faculty merrlber's
"[0 ]bligations to the public, including participation in pro bono activities" and to evaluate
periodically whether faculty members are meeting this obligation. ABA STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL
OF
LAW
SCHOOLS
404(a)(5),
404(b)
(2005),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter4.htm1; see also ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH.,
PuRSUING EQUAL JUSTICE: LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES 29 (2002),
available at http://www.aals.org/equaljustice/final_report.pdf ("[L]aw schools and law faculty
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These heightened professional responsibilities mean that law school
administrators and professors have an enhanced duty to ensure that their decisions
on law clinic cases, clients, and methods of representation advance the goal of equal
access to legal assistance. As the dean of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
explained when he rejected pressure from state legislators to exclude controversial
clients from representation by the school's law clinics:
The principles of the legal profession are, to me, even more powerful than
concepts of academic freedom in this instance. The fundamental question
has been asked throughout this controversy: "What are we teaching law
students when we decided not to represent people who otherwise would
not have a voice because of this legislative pressure?,,191

D. Reasons Proffered for Restricting Access
The bar's promotion of or acquiescence to restrictions on equal access to legal
representation has been explained in three primary ways. However, as shown below,
none of these reasons are persuasive.
The first justification is that limited resources require some restrictions on who
can be served by civil legal assistance programs. Because government and bar
sponsored programs can only address about one-fifth of the legal needs of the poor,
this argument asserts that there is no good reason to take on controversial clients like
undocumented aliens or prisoners.
The problems with this argument are many. The priorities of legal assistance
programs should be based on objective, fair assessments of the legal needs of the
community, the merits of the case, and the likely results. Ethics rules and opinions
strongly condemn client or case decisions that seek to avoid representing unpopular
clients or upsetting politicians or other influential community leaders. 192 Yet, it is
have professional responsibilities to promote equal justice work in their teaching, scholarship,
and service.").
191 Terry Carter, Law Clinics Face Critics, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 24, 26. An AALS
report echoed this need to act in a way that is consistent with the principles of the legal
profession:
If our conduct and actions are inconsistent with the principles and rules that we
teach, we undermine both our credibility as teachers and the legitimacy of the
ethical principles and rules themselves. If we appear to -be insincere about our pro
bono responsibilities, we also will encourage law students to be skeptical, indeed
cynical, about the many other moral principles that distinguish our profession from
a trade.
COMM'N ON PRo BONO & PuB. SERVo OPPORTUNITIES, AALS, LEARNING TO SERVE

(1999).
192

See supra notes 138-139, 151-158 and accompanying text.
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clear that Congress's restrictions are based on politics and should not be emulated by
the legal profession. In fact, some proponents of LSC restrictions justified denying
representation by arguing that certain poor persons would not be without access to
attorneys because other public and private entities, such as private attorneys and the
bar, would fund the representation that the federal government prohibited. 193 Of
course where the legal profession's legal assistance programs mirror the LSC
restrictions, the profession is not providing this presumed representation to non
LSC-eligible clients but is reinforcing the denial of access to legal representation
sought by LSC's critics.
In addition, denying assistance to certain unpopular clients or causes serves to
insulate some laws from judicial review or law breakers from enforcement and
makes those clients even more vulnerable to infringements of their legal rights. For
example, in the case of undocumented aliens and prisoners, the failure of the bar to
provide legal assistance is believed to have exacerbated violations of their legal
rights and emboldened unscrupulous employers and prison officials to violate the
law. 194 If anything, the unpopularity of the clients or causes should motivate
individual lawyers and the bar to provide legal assistance since the restrictions in
federal and state-funded legal assistance programs have made these groups even
more in need of help.
A related argument claims that poor people are better served when limited legal
assistance is focused on the most typical day-to-day legal problems of the poor and
on individual cases rather than on larger cases or more complex legal problems. Yet,
the legal profession should be concerned about how best to advance equal access to
justice and the client's cause. Denying a lawyer for the poor the ability to address the
client's concerns through lobbying, class actions, or attorneys' fee requests may
prevent the attorney and client from choosing the best means to achieve the desired
goal and may result in second-class legal representation for the poor. 195 The legal
profession cannot countenance a restriction on a lawyer's practice that is not based
on an objective determination of the prospective client's and community's needs and
of the lawyer's professional judgment about the best way to address those needs.
193 Abel & Kaufman, supra note 27, at 510 & n.93 (quoting statements by Congressmen
Robert Doman (R.-Cal.) and Charles Taylor (R.-N.C.»; see also BRENNAN Cm. FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 93, at 19 (quoting a 1995 pledge from a former LSC president that lawyer pro bono
efforts "will cushion the termination of federal funding for legal services"); End Legal-Aid
Program for Poor?-Interview with Edwin Meese III, U.S. NEWS & WORID REp., Aug. 3,
1981, at 33, 33 (arguing that cutbacks in LSC activities could be offset by expanding law
school clinical programs).
194 See supra notes 34, 37 and accompanying text.
195 Two experts on civil legal assistance for the poor characterized the restriction on the
kinds of legal work that lawyers can perform as "perhaps even more damaging and insidious"
than the restrictions on the kinds of cases and clients that legal services offices can handle.
ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERlE, Cm. FOR LAW & SOC. POllCY, SECURING EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR AlL: A BRIEF HIsTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STAlES 35
(2003).

1076

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No.4

The mantra of the legal profession should be that if a lawyer representing a paying
client is not restrained, then a lawyer for a poor client should not be restrained.
A third argument in defense of some restrictions is that the bar should avoid
assisting clients or causes that are "political" or "ideological." Yet, as argued above,
there is nothing political or ideological about ensuring that legal representation is
fully available or that both sides of an issue are well represented. 196 If it is not
political for a business to hire an attorney to sue the government over new regulatory
restrictions, then it is no more political for an undocumented alien to have the ability
to sue to enforce employment-related rights. As explained by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, the bar's involvement, and even use of members' dues, in providing
legal services to the poor is non-ideological. 197 Lawyers simply cannot allow
Congress, state legislators, or others to define the act of providing a poor person with
a lawyer as a political or ideological activity.198
V. CONCLUSION
The legal profession must move beyond the rhetoric of equal access to legal
representation. Individual lawyers and judges, along with courts and bar
associations, must take steps to ensure they are not contributing to the inability of
some unpopular clients or causes to gain access to legal representation. They must
also avoid placing restraints on the legal services that lawyers for the poor may
provide. Indeed, the legal profession must actively seek to ensure that clients
restricted by Congress or state legislatures are provided access to legal
representation through the various funding and service programs of the legal
profession and that lawyers for the indigent are not restricted in ways that do not also
apply to lawyers representing paying clients.
The profession should begin by pressing Congress to remove the 1996
restrictions on clients, causes, and methods of legal representation. These restrictions
were the result of politics and enacted to appease special interests hostile to legal
assistance to the poor. They do not comport with the legal profession's position that
allocations of limited resources must be done fairly and reasonably. Professor David
Luban argues that "neither the Bar nor legal-services establishments offered any
organized protest when the 1996 restrictions were enacted-unlike a similar assault
in 1981, when law school deans and the organized bar united in protest against

196 See supra text accompanying notes 47, 140-143. This is particularly true in the case
of programs, such as those developed and operated by the legal profession, that are not
financed by taxpayer funds.
197 See In re Petition of the Wis. Trust Account Found., Inc., 2005 WI 35, 277 Wis. 2d
xiii, xvi (2005).
198 Professor David Luban has extensively addressed the attack on the LSC and the
contention that lawyers for the poor "practice politics, not law" in DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STIJDY 293-391 (1988).
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efforts to abolish the LSC.,,199 The bar claims it was active in 1996, saving LSC from
being abolished. 2°O However, even if the bar's past efforts were significant,
prominent members of the legal profession and the organized bar must consistently
and strongly press Congress to abolish those restrictions.
This is not to imply naively that rolling back restrictions will be easy, given the
enmity of some members of Congress and certain special interest groups toward
many legal aid cases and methods. However, at the very least, the legal profession
should press for changes that would allow recipients of LSC funding to be able again
to use non-LSC funds to engage in restricted activities. Prohibiting the primary LSC
funded legal services organizations in a state from using non-LSC funds for any
prohibited purpose and applying the restrictions to other entities that receive
transfers of LSC funds have left many states with no provider able to serve restricted
clients. 201 Alan Houseman argued:
[T]hose who care about equal justice for the poor must take whatever steps
, possible to remove restrictions on which clients can be served and what
legal services can be provided. Perhaps the most pernicious is the
restriction on the use of non-LSC funds by LSC-funded recipients, which
dries up funding sources that have in the past and would have in the future
provided resources to serve the critical legal problems of low-income
clients. 202
The legal profession's goal of removing congressional restraints on equal access to
legal representation could begin, therefore, with an effort to return to the pre-1996
rules on use of non-LSC funds.
The legal profession should similarly use its influence to convince state
legislatures to remove existing civil legal assistance funding restrictions and not to
adopt any new restrictions that have the effect of denying access to representation to
some groups or limiting the legal services they can receive. At the very least, where
legislatures seem unwilling to remove all restrictions on class actions or lobbying,
they should be pressed to impose only the conditions on legal services that existed
prior to the 1996 congressional restrictions. Thus, class actions could be pursued
where the case is first approved by the governing board of the grantee, and lobbying
Luban, supra note 12, at 225.
ABA, PROMOTING PROFESSIONAUSM 64 (1998) ("Since 1995, the ABA working with
state and local bars, created and guided a national grassroots network reaching more than
100,000 lawyers to fight for the preservation of the Legal Services Corporation. These efforts
have resulted in strong, bipartisan votes in both Houses of Congress to preserve the
Corporation and its funding.").
201 Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at 880 n.26; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Note, however, that with transfers of LSC funds for the sole purpose of funding private
attorney involvement activities, the restrictions only apply to the LSC funds transferred. See
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
202 Houseman, supra note 25, at 2188 n.8.
199

200
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would be allowed where the attorney determined it was necessary for the proper
representation of a particular client. Even many objections to attorneys' fees could
be ameliorated by directing that any awards be placed into the state's legal assistance
fund and distributed broadly, rather than awarded to the office of the attorney
handling the case.
Restrictions in judge- and lawyer-sponsored or controlled legal assistance
funding and volunteer service programs also should be abolished. With these
programs, the profession has no one to blame for the restrictions other than its own
acquiescence to efforts to deny access to legal representation or ignorance of the
effects of its program decisions. As Part IV of this Article established, the politics,
interest group pressure, and hostile public sentiment that have driven Congress and
state legislatures to restrict legal services should play no role, either knowingly or
unwittingly, in the legal profession's decisions on eligibility for free legal
representation. Those decisions must strive for universal access. Where limited
resources prevent that ideal, the profession must allocate available funds and
volunteers through objective decisions motivated by a desire for equal access to legal
representation and reflective of need, merit, and likely benefits.
The legal profession's funding and volunteer lawyer program decisions must be
conscious of the effect that congressional and other restrictions are having on the
goal of equal access to legal representation in that particular state. Some states have
done legal needs studies that have helped identify the restricted groups, sometimes
referred to as "gap clients," excluded from funding by LSC restrictions. 203 Those
states have then sought to ensure that decisions on how to distribute scarce legal
resources take into account and seek to address these gap clients. 204 The legal
profession too should direct its attention and resources to making sure gap clients
have equal access to available legal resources.
On the issue of class actions, lobbying, and other restrictions on methods of
representation, with the increased devolution of government social service programs
from the federal government to the state, "state level advocacy has become essential
to ensuring that the rights and interests of low-income persons are protected and
enhanced.,,205 A study by Alan Houseman concluded that successful advocacy for
poor persons required that each state have "a capacity independent of LSC funded
203 See, e.g., ALASKA REPORT, supra note 62, at 19-22; Abel & Udell, supra note 27, at
875 n.3, 880 n.26 (listing state reports in Alaska, California, Georgia, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Texas that identify gaps in access to legal services caused by the
congressional restrictions).
204 See, e.g., WASH. STAlE ACCESS TO JUSTICE Bo., PLAN FOR THE DELIVERY OF CWIL
LEGAL AID TO Low INCOME PEoPLE IN WASHlNGTON STAlE 6, 22-24 (2006), available at
http://www.wsba.org/atj/committees/2006stateplan.pdf; Memorandum from Jamie L. Mack,
Ga. Access to Justice Project, to All Attendees of the Closing the Gap Symposium (Sept. 23,
1998) (on file with author).
205 ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, ClR. FOR LAW & SOC. POllCY, THE MISSlNG LINK IN JUSTICE
COMMUNITIES: THE CAPACITY IN EACH STAlE FOR STAlE LEVEL ADVOCACY, COORDlNATION
AND SUPPORT 7 (2001).
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providers to engage in restricted representation that cannot be undertaken by LSC
funded providers" through statewide advocacy, including representation before
legislative and administrative bodies.206 The ABA's standards for civil legal
assistance programs seek to address this need, in part, by directing that programs
207
provide for lobbying and class action representation. Thus, the legal profession's
efforts to expand legal assistance should address this need for unrestricted advocacy,
especially in states where there is little or no legal assistance funding unencumbered
by LSC restrictions?08
The legal profession must cease to be an accomplice in efforts to provide
"liberty and justice for some." The profession cannot paradoxically proclaim its
commitment to access to legal representation and yet subvert that very goal by
imposing restrictions on unpopular clients or types of legal services. If the principles
of the legal profession mean anything, then all lawyers, courts, and bar organizations
need to fight to ensure access to justice is truly equal and without restrictions.

206
207

Id. at 1, 7.
See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.

208 "State justice communities also must ensure that a capacity exists to provide
representation on restricted cases and for clients who cannot be represented by LSC-funded
providers." HOUSEMAN, supra note 205, at 8.

